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SYMPOSIUM
THE FUTURE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS
AS INSTITUTIONS IN THE LAW
STATE HIGH COURTS AS CENTRAL FIGURES IN
THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
The Honorable Randall T. Shepard*
There is a curious dichotomy in the way we lawyers look at state
supreme courts and their work. On the one hand, most American
lawyers commit a substantial part of our attention in the day-to-day
practice of law to the decisions announced by state supreme courts
and, indeed, to decisions announced by the intermediate courts as
well. The decisions of these courts have occupied a prominent place
in the legal profession for more than a century. Ever since Christo-
pher Columbus Langdell introduced the caselaw method of instruc-
tion at Harvard Law School in the 1880s, most American lawyers have
commenced their introduction into the law by reading, criticizing,
and debating appellate court opinions. In the basic first-year courses
in which most law students enroll, courses like contracts, torts, and
property, a substantial percentage of the reading material is the work
of state appellate courts. Who can walk out of an American law school
without having contemplated the intricacies of Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co.' or Hawkins v. McGee?2
Teaching methods change, of course, and the practice of incul-
cating legal thinking in students through Socratic dissection of appel-
late decisions does not hold sway as it once did. Still, the sources of
* ChiefJustice of Indiana. A.B. Princeton University 1969; J.D. Yale Law School
1972; LL.M. University of Virginia 1995.
1 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
2 146 A. 641 (1929) (the hairy hand case). Equally firm in the memory of most
lawyers are the prominent English common law cases we read in the same courses,
such as the light "squib" case concerning foreseeability of risk, Shepherd v. Scot 95
Eng. Rep 1124 (1773), or Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B. 1707) (the
case of the duck pond decoy).
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reading material have not changed a great deal. In the current era,
even a topic recently so dominated by federal jurisprudence as consti-
tutional law now finds itself joined in the law school course bulletins
by a burgeoning number of courses on state constitutional law.3 In
the daily practice of law, it is apparent that the opinions written by
state appellate courts are still a strong force. Lawyers vote on this with
their checkbooks. In 1996, they bought subscriptions sustaining the
publication of 41,550 state court opinions.4
For all the time we lawyers and judges spend focused on the writ-
ten decisions of state supreme courts, however, we spend relatively
little time assessing the role of these courts as institutions in our pro-
fession.5 The legal literature on topics such as how appellate courts
reach these decisions is sparse indeed.6 Similarly sparse is the list of
articles about the other ways in which state supreme courts affect the
practice of law, legal education, and the like.
3 Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism's First
Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. xiii (1996).
4 West Publishing Company published 41,550 opinions of the state courts and
17,209 of the federal courts in 1996. Telephone Interview with Kate MacEachem,
Representative, West Publishing Company (Apr. 11, 1997). State court opinions out-
number federal opinions by nearly two and a half times, but the disparity in appellate
work is even greater because the federal total includes opinions of the district courts.
West does not release subscription information, but it is safe to bet that West sells
many, many more subscriptions to its state law reporters than it does to the federal
reporters, although electronic research may be narrowing the gap.
In another light, many of the federal cases reported are in the federal forum only
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996). The substantive law in
diversity cases is state law, Erie R.R- v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Accordingly,
federal courts routinely look to the state supreme courts for controlling precedent
when deciding cases, a principle of judicial federalism recently reiterated by the
United States Supreme Court. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 117 S. Ct.
1055, 1073-74 (1997) (certification of questions to state supreme courts for authorita-
tive interpretation of novel or unsettled questions of state law is preferred to
"[s]peculation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute").
5 Among the best works examining the institutions are KARL LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRaDrrION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA
ALDis PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988); Robert A. Kagan
et. al., The Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1977);
Thomas B. Marvell & Mae Kuykendall, Appellate Courts Facts and Figures, ST. CT. J.,
Spring 1980, at 9.
6 When I was appointed an appellate judge in 1985 after a stint as a trial court
judge, I realized that I knew relatively little about what supreme court justices do all
day and how they do it. I asked a teacher of law, a long-time friend, whether he could
point me to any writing about the internal dynamics of appellate courts. He could
not. Even today, I would be hard-pressed to do so.
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Notwithstanding this paucity of legal literature, it is apparent that
state supreme courts shape our work as lawyers from law school to
filing complaints and arguing before juries. Moreover, they are en-
gines of change.7
The ways in which state supreme courts shape the profession af-
fect us as lawyers from the earliest point in our legal education. The
system by which the American Bar Association (ABA) accredits law
schools, a process which influences American legal education in sub-
stantial ways,8 rests in the main on the regulatory authority of state
supreme courts. It depends principally on the willingness of those
courts to designate graduation from a school accredited by the ABA as
the leading credential necessary to sit for bar examinations.9
7 In civil procedure, for example, it has been the Arizona Supreme Court that
has struck out on new paths to reform the system of discovery invented by the 1939
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thomas A. Zlaket, Encouraging Litigators to Be Law-
yers: Arizona's New Civil Rules, 25 Amz. ST. LJ. 1 (1993);Jeffrey D. Collins, Note, Alaska
Rule 26: A Quixotic Venture into the World of Mandatory Disclosure, 11 ALASKA L. REV. 337
(1994). Modem jury reform is a state court movement. SeeJuRy TRIAL INNOVATIONS
(G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997).
8 See, Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105 (1992). Professor
Carrington discusses political correctness, Bakke intellectual "ideological fashion,"
and the accreditation process. He concludes among other things that accreditation
has had a significant impact on raising the status of legal education in comparison to
other learned professions (e.g., medicine) within academic circles. He credits accred-
itation with effectively promoting and guarding intellectual freedom and administra-
tive autonomy on law school faculties and in law school libraries. He maintains,
however, that accreditation has had little, if any impact on the demographic make-up
of law schools and that diversity requirements in accreditation may endanger the via-
bility of the process.
9 There are two other relevant sources of authority. First, the United States De-
partment of Education recognizes ABA's Council of the Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar as the accrediting agency for the Department's purposes.
Recognition of Accrediting Agencies, State Agencies for Approval of Public Post-
secondary Vocational Education, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,026-03 (1996) (proposed Dec. 16,
1996) (petition for renewal of application). While this recognition connects the ABA
process to the federal government, its actual impact is relatively modest. Most Ameri-
can law schools are accredited as part of their parent universities by regional accredit-
ing agencies; for them, the Department of Education designation of the ABA is of no
moment. For about a dozen law schools that stand independent of any university,
however, ABA accreditation makes possible various federal loan and grant programs
for which they would otherwise not be eligible.
Second, the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) performs an accredita-
tion function with substantial standing inside the academic community. The accredi-
tation function actually focuses on the membership requirements of the AALS.
Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Law School Accreditation Process, 30 WAKE.: Fom--r L.
Ri.v. 379, 382-83 (1995). AALS affords membership only to ABA accredited schools,
of which there are 179. SECTION OF Li.EGAL EmUc. & A)MISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, A
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Similarly, the bar examinations themselves are administered al-
most wholly under the supervision of boards of bar examiners ap-
pointed or supervised by state supreme courts. Admissions to the bar
of federal district courts, for example, is a relatively perfunctory mat-
ter for persons admitted to practice in a state's courts. 10
The influence of state supreme courts and their bar examiners
on bar admissions and thus on legal education has been most appar-
ent in the recent movement spawned by state bars, law schools, and
courts to collaborate on reforming the way lawyers are edu-
cated."This collaboration has taken the form of state legal conclaves,
of which there have been twenty-seven.
The entire field of legal ethics is focused on the rules adopted by
state supreme courts.I2 While the ABA model codes of conduct for
lawyers and judges' 3 are national in scope, their legal legitimacy rests
on the decisions of state supreme courts to adopt them in whole or in
part.'4
Similarly, bar discipline in the American legal profession is
largely state bar discipline. While federal courts act separately on dis-
ciplinary cases involving individual lawyers, in actuality they rarely run
their own disciplinary operations.' 5
REVIEW OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES FALL 1995, at 1 (Rick L. Morgan
ed., 1995). There are just 160 AALS member schools. See, The Association of American
Law Schools Has 160 Member Schools (visited Mar. 29, 1997) <http://www.aals.org/
members.html>.
10 See e.g., S.D. IND. L. R. 83.5(b).
11 These reforms have been set in motion in the wake of the ABA's "MacCrate
Report." sSECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA, LEGAL EDUCUCA-
TION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992).
12 See, e.g., S.D. IND., L. R. 83.5(f).
13 These are products of the Association's work from early in the twentieth cen-
tury. See Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraints and Liberty inJudicial Ethics, 9
GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS 1059, 1063-64 (1996).
14 Virtually every state, for example, has adopted the ABA's principal code for
judges. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 4 (1990) (noting
that all states but Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin adopted the 1972 code).
15 Generally, federal courts rely on state disciplinary commissions to prosecute
allegations of professional misconduct. See, e.g., S.D. IND. RULES OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT R. V (disciplinary proceedings), R. X (appointment of counsel); see also In
re Maternowski, 674 N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. 1996). In fact, federal jurisprudence in disci-
plinary matters is so deferential that Younger abstention has been held to apply in civil
cases where the plaintiff seeks to enjoin state disciplinary proceedings, Hodari v. At-
torney Grievance Comm'n, 1996 WL 426485, *3 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (memorandum
decision) (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 475 U.S.
457 (1982)), and state disciplinary rules have been held to be the proper substantive
law for deciding disciplinary cases in federal district court, Cardona v. General Motors
Corp., 939 F. Supp. 351, 355 (D.NJ. 1996) (same facts and legal issue may engender
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In areas of substantive law, quite aside from the courses still used
for first-year legal education that flow from Blackstone's influence,
state supreme courts dominate fields such as products liability, fami-
lies and children, and insurance, to name a few. Civil liberties advo-
cates find themselves increasingly in state court, looking to make new
law under state constitutions. The highest visibility cases of all, those
involving the death penalty, are largely in the hands of state supreme
courts, especially after the 1996 amendments to the federal habeas
statutes.16
Which brings me to the other side of the dichotomy I spoke of at
the outset. For all of the important tasks in which the states' highest
courts are so central, analysis of their work does not regularly find its
way into legal literature. The writings that are published often fail to
focus adequately on the future these courts are building.
With this in mind, we present a symposium on the present and
future role of state supreme courts. Professors Williams, Friesen, and
Tarr address the important and developing field of state constitu-
tional law. William Rakes then examines ways in which the three
branches of the bar-courts, practitioners, and the academy-can
work together; and Professor Uelmen addresses political threats to the
independence of state judiciaries. Professor White, Erica Moeser, and
Professor Hazard take up, respectively, the supreme courts' role in
regulating the profession: legal education, bar admission, and ethics.
Steven Brill turns our attention to televisions in the'courtroom. And
Ken Bode moderates the final roundtable, composed of ChiefJustices
Shirley S. Abrahamson of Wisconsin, Robert Benham of Georgia,
I
differing results within same circuit because "Our Federalism" permits states to adopt
differing rules of professional conduct).
In cases where judicial misconduct is alleged, the ordinary proceeding is for the
circuit court to appoint an investigatory committee to conduct hearings on the matter
after initial review by the chiefjudge. The procedures are governed by circuit rules
under the authority of federal statute. 28 U.S.CA. 372(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1996).
Assembly of an investigatory committee is episodic; the circuits do not maintain per-
manent judicial disciplinary committees. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. JUDICIAL MISCONDUCr L
4(e), 9 (committee composed of chief judge and an equal number of circuit and
district judges not of the respondent judge's district convened upon order of chief
judge).
The difference in investigatory processes between allegation of attorney miscon-
duct and judicial misconduct is a simple matter of subject matter jurisdiction. The
federal judicial power was established by Article III of the Constitution, but attorneys'
licenses to practice law are granted by the states. Accordinglyjudicial misconduct is a
circuit matter.
16 Felkerv. Turpin, 116 S.Ct. 2333 (1996); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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Perry 0. Hooper, Sr. of Alabama, and E. Norman Veasey of Delaware.
The panel considers the work of state high courts in several fields of
substantive law.
The symposium was presented at a recent meeting of the Confer-
ence of Chief Justices of the supreme courts of each state. It is a
unique joint venture undertaken by the Conference of ChiefJustices,
the Notre Dame Law Review, and the Supreme Court of Indiana. We
extend our earnest thanks to the chief justices, leading scholars, and
practitioners who have contributed their thoughts to this endeavor.
